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value. The results of a judgmental survey carried out on both Naval tele-
communications and fleet operations personnel provide a preliminary confirm-
ation of these conclusions. The recommendation is then made to implement
some type of demand management scheme.
A review of available demand management tools is made leading to the
final recommendation that some form of demand based pricing strategy, in-
corporating elements of both priority and peak load pricing methods, should
be adopted.
One major objection to the efficacy of pricing techniques is addressed
by way of reference to the Naval fuel allocation system and its effective-
ness as a means of managing demand for fuel. Lastly, areas requiring sig-
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The Naval Telecommunications System (NTS) capacity to
handle message traffic is frequently exceeded by high levels
of user demand often resulting in a failure to meet message
speed of delivery standards. In order to resolve this
problem, managers of the NTS must decide to either expand
system capacity, control demand, or apply some combination of
these two alternatives.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze this situation and
make recommendations based upon the application of economic
theory. The principles leading to the definition and
understanding of optimal system capacity and user demand are
laid out as they apply to the NTS. Having established a
theoretical rationale for defining the ideal system capacity,
a number of significant practical barriers to the
implementaticn of this approach are explored. These barriers
can be characterized as deriving from the tremendous
difficulties encountered in the attempt to quantify cost and
demand parameters necessary for determining the actual level
of optimal system capacity. -.
Although a straightforward method of applying the relevant
economic principles cannot be found, the theories discussed
are of practical use, nevertheless, in that they predict a
situation wherein the application of demand reduction
techniques would be appropriate. This situation arises out
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of the fact that current NTS practices impose negligible costs
upon users of the system. This in turn can be predicted to
result in high levels of user demand with many of the messages
serviced being of relatively low value. The results of a
judgmental survey carried out on both Naval telecommunications
and fleet operations personnel provide a preliminary
confirmation of these conclusions. The recommendation is then
made to implement some type of demand management scheme.
A review of available demand management tools is made
leading to the final recommendation that some form of demand
based pricing strategy, incorporating elements of both
priority and peak load pricing methods, should be adopted.
One major objection to the efficacy of pricing techniques
is addressed by way of reference to the Naval fuel allocation
system and its effectiveness as a means of managing demand
for fuel. Lastly, areas requiring significant further study
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The Naval Telecommunications System (NTS) capacity to
handle message traffic is frequently exceeded by high levels
of user demand. This often results in message backlogs and
failure to meet established speed of delivery standards. In
order to resolve this problem, managers of the NTS must decide
to either expand system capacity (capital investment), control
demand, or apply some combination of these two alternatives.
B. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the problem faced
by the NTS with respect to excess demand in order to make
recommendations towards resolving the problem. Recommendations
are made in terms of defining and achieving the appropriate
mix of demand management and/or capital investment techniques.
Economic theory is applied as a means of providing analytical
tools which are useful in gaining a more precise understanding
of the nature of this problem and its solution.
The following specific questions are addressed:
- How is this situation explained using basic economic
principles?
- How is ideal system capacity defined?
1
- Can the theoretical model of ideal system capacity be
applied to the NTS?
- Are the barriers to straightforward application of
the economic model surmountable? If so, in what way?
- What is the appropriate level of demand management
and/or capital expansion to solve the NTS excess
demand problem?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis is an attempt to apply basic economic theory
to problems of excess demand currently faced by the NTS.
Questions concerning the practical application of economic
principles from the viewpoint of a NTS manager are given
particular emphasis.
A great deal of effort and analysis towards defining and
quantifying the extent of demand outstripping NTS capacity
will not be invested. Reference is made to previous work
which outlines this information in greater detail. This work
will briefly sketch the nature and significance of this
problem in order to serve as a starting point for further
analysis which comprises the main thrust of this thesis.
A recommendation to reduce system demand via
implementation of a demand management mechanism is made,
followed by a brief review of applicable methods. Several
major objections to instituting this type of solution are
discussed.
2
Implementing any type of demand management Pi-thod in order
to obtain a specific goal is a complicated task. This thesis
only goes so far as making broad recommendations. Additional
questions and areas requiring significant further study are
outlined.
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Problem definition is followed by explanation and
discussion of economic principles used to define the concept
of ideal long run system capacity. From the point of view of
a NTS senior manager, barriers to the direct application of
this concept are explored.
Upon concluding that direct application of the economic
concept of ideal system capacity is impractical, information
previously presented is reviewed with an eye towards finding
information which might yet prove to be of practical use.
Observations concerning excess demand and the relative value
of messages entered into the NTS are forwarded. These
conclusions are informally tested for validity by use of a
judgmental survey of a select group of Naval personnel.
The recommendation that a demand management strategy be
pursued is followed by a brief review of available pricing
strategies. Broad recommendations concerning the type of
pricing mechanism best suited to the NTS are made, followed
by a discussion of potential shortcomings involved in the
pursuit of a pricing strategy.
3
Lastly, information, conclusions, and recommendations are





The NTS is faced with making critical management decisions
concerning the system's ability to cope with user demand for
services. This chapter will outline the facts concerning
excess demand, provide a definition of the problem in economic
terms, and review the broad alternatives available to
management in dealing with this problem.
B. DEMAND EXCEEDS SYSTEM CAPACITY
What is meant by demand outstripping capacity? Demand is
defined as, ". ..a list of prices and the corresponding
quantities that consumers are willing and able to purchase..."
[Ref. l:p. 22] Capacity, or available supply, is defined
as, "...a list of prices and the corresponding quantities that
a group of suppliers (firms) would be willing and able to
offer for sale at each price..." [Ref. l:p. 30] In a market
economy, an equilibrium point between supply and demand occurs
where the quantity demanded at a particular price equals the
quantity supplied at that price. This relationship is










QUANTITY PER UNIT OF TIME
Figure 1. Supply and Demand Equilibrium
The relationship between supply and demand for the NTS
differs from this simple model in several ways. The NTS does
not presently charge users for the provision of its services.
The NTS is willing and able to deliver any number of messages
up to full system capacity. Capacity is determined primarily
by the throughput limits of existing hardware, therefore, the
NTS could not exceed this capacity in the short run regardless
of price. This relationship is represented by a vertical (or
near vertical) supply curve rising from the quantity
representing system capacity.
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With respect to user demand, users will demand service as
long as the value of their message exceeds their cost of using
the system. There will be a small class of messages whose
value is extremely high (e.g., warnings of imminent attack,
nuclear accidents, etc.) so that their transmission would be
requested regardless of price. Apart from this small class
of high value messages (where the slope of the demand curve
for this class is nearly vertical), the rest of the demand
curve would be downward sloping in that as the price to the
user decreases, an increasing quantity of message services
will be requested.
Current price to the user consists primarily of
opportunity costs (i.e., how the time spent in the activity
of generating a message might have otherwise been spent),
along with relatively minor material costs such as paper and
sundry office supplies. The important point is that the
actual cost to the user does not include any type of charge
for services by the supplier and that the opportunity costs
themselves are quite low.
In this context, demand outstripping supply means that the
quantity of services demanded at the present price to the user
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Figure 2. Excess Demand
Without going into great detail, one empirical measure
that might be employed to document this excess demand focuses
on NTS speed of delivery standards, i.e., excessive delay
represented by exceeding message precedence time standards can
be equated with demand for service exceeding NTS capacity.
In one twelve-day period, a total of 4,493 messages were keyed
over the general Fleet Broadcast. Of these, a total of 787,
or 18%, failed to meet speed of delivery standards as measured
from time of receipt from originator to the time the message
was actually keyed on the broadcast. on the worst day, a
8
total of 100 out of 324 messages exceeded speed of delivery
standards, 94 of these being Immediate precedence or greater.
[Ref. 2:pp. 20-22]
C. MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
In the face of excess demand, the general decision
categories facing NTS managers are as follows:
- reduce demand for NTS services
- increase system capacity
- incorporate elements of both demand reduction and
system expansion
What is of particular interest to us here is not what
these various schemes might be, but rather, on what basis
should management decide to pursue one course of action over
the other?
Upon closer examination, the decisions which must be made
exist in two dimensions; short run and long run. Note that
the outstripping of supply by demand described above is a
short run situation (i.e., it refers to an output which is
calculated on the basis of current fixed material assets).
What is of primary interest is the managerial decision with
respect to long run considerations.
By definition, the "short run" is a period of time wherein
at least one of the inputs to the production equation is
fixed. The "long run", on the other hand, is the period of
time in which all inputs are considered variable. [Ref. 3:pp.
9
229-230] In the short run, new technology cannot be
incorporated into the fleet which might increase total message
throughput capacity. In the long run, all factors affecting
capacity are considered variable, including any and all
technologies, encoding methods, and respective equipment
quantities which might increase tutal NTS capacity.' In the
short run, there really is no decision for management to make
other than how to manipulate demand so as to relieve the
existing bottleneck. The method chosen should result in the
NTS being used as efficiently as possible, i.e., reducing
demand in such a way that those messages excluded from the
system are those which are of least value.
The larger decision, the long run decision faced by NTS
management, is a type of unconstrained optimization problem,
i.e., how can the maximum benefit of services provided by the
NTS to the Navy be realized? What level of service is
optimum? Once having derived that information, and
considering all inputs variable, what is the optimal
combination of inputs necessary to produce it?
If the optimum level of service is found to be at or less
than current system capacity, then demand reduction is clearly
indicated. If the optimum level is greater than current
capacity but less than current demand, then a combination of
I A more precise definition of the short run, long run
time periods and their significance is found in Chapter 3.
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system expansion and demand reduction is warranted. Lastly,
if optimal capacity is found to lie at a level exceeding
current user demand, then system expansion is in order.
The central challenge then, is to define and locate the
optimal long run level of system capacity in order to provide
a basis for making management decisions. It is the





Economic theory provides a model of ideal system capacity
based upon a balance of system costs and benefits. This
chapter introduces terms, definitions, and concepts necessary
to understand the notion of ideal system capacity, the optimum
combination of inputs to produce this capacity, and how this
applies to the NTS.
B. MARGINAL REVENUE AND MARGINAL COST
The solution to the problem concerning an optimal level
of system service and the optimum combination of inputs
necessary to produce it is found by reference to defining and
maintaining a balance between system costs and benefits.
Simply put, "a firm will increase any activity so long as the
additional revenue from the increased activity exceeds the
additional cost of the increase in the activity." [Ref. 1:
p. 52)
Several definitions are required at this point, in order
to proceed with a more thorough elaboration of this concept.
- Marginal revenue (MR): change in revenue per unit
change in output. [Ref 3:p. 268)
- Marginal cost (MC): additional cost per unit increase
in output. [Ref 3:p. 227]
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- Average cost (AC): mean cost per unit. [Ref 3:p. 236]
The above-mentioned costs may also be grouped according
to the previous distinction made between the short and long
run time intervals.
- Short run (SR): period of time in which the firm must
consider some of its inputs to be fixed.
- Long run (LR): period of time over which all inputs
are treated as variable.
These terms are used to identify different periods of time
in which a firm may alter its production decisions. [Ref 3:
pp. 229-230] For example, short run production decisions are
made within the constraints imposed by fixed plant size, this
being an element which cannot be altered on short notice.
Long run production decisions, on the other hand, are
unconstrained with respect to plant size since over long
periods of time all input components may be varied.
In terms of MR and MC, the optimization principle can be
restated as follows: a firm will select that level of output
where MR equals MC. [Ref 4:p. 47] This level of output is
shown by Qprof, in Figure 3. This is the level of output where
the revenue realized from selling one additional unit equals
the additional cost of having produced it. The reasoning
behind this principle makes intuitive sense and can be applied




Marginal revenue is only important to a firm seeking to
maximize profit. The NTS goal is maximum benefit (utility)
to the Navy, not profit. The point we are interested in
defining is where the marginal benefit (i.e., marginal
utility) of a naval message equals marginal cost. This is the
point where the utility gained from the transmission of one
additional message equals the cost of having transmitted that
additional message. More specifically, this is the point where
marginal utility (MU) equals long run marginal cost (LRMC).
Their point of intersection will define the optimal production
quantity where marginal benefits and costs are in equilibrium,







QUANTITY PER UNIT OF TIME
Figure 3. Factors Determining Production
Quantity Optimization
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How does one measure the utility of a naval message? As
with any good or service, the utility cannot be measured
directly but is measured indirectly in terms of how much one
is willing to give up for it. For naval messages then, the
number of messages whose utility is greater than or equal to
the actual cost of sending a message will represent the total
quantity of service demanded. This is simply another way to
describe the relationships which underlie the demand curve and
its particular shape. The demand curve represents the
marginal utility (MU) curve for nava: messages; that is,
D = MU. More will be said concerning the actual shape of this
curve later.'
D. OPTIMUM CAPACITY
To find the level of service (Q) where optimum benefit to
the Navy is realized, we must find the point where LRMC equals
demand. The optimal quantity of services provided by the NTS
(Q') will be defined by the point where the LRMC curve
intersects the demand curve (LRMC = D) as shown in Figure 4.
2 With the previous discussion of the current "price" of a
naval message in mind, it should not be surprising that high demand
levels are observed, and that the utility of a great many of these
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Figure 4. Optimal Production Quantity (Q*)
If the point where LRMC = D is less than the present level
of system capacity, then NTS managers should direct their
efforts towards reducing system capacity and constraining
demand through appropriate demand management policies. If
that point is found to lie beyond the present level, then NTS
managers should seek to expand capacity in the long run,
although demand management policies may be required to
restrict demand within system capacity in tae short run. The
goal is to operate where LRMC = D.
To make the proper long run decision, two categories of
long run cost must become known: Long Run Marginal Cost
(LRMC) and Long Run Average Cost (LRAC). The central role
16
of LRMC with respect to defining Q' has been outlined. In
order to make our analysis complete we are ultimately
concerned with the most efficient combination of inputs in the
short run which will allow the NTS to operate at that optimal
level (Q') defined by the long run planning curves. The LRAC
curve provides the data which can be utilized to logically
translate long run ideal capacity to a specific short run
system configuration. An organization plans in the long
run but operates in the short run. (Ref l:p. 295]
E. OPTIMUM INPUTS
At each possible level of output there is a corresponding
least cost combination of inputs. Each set of least cost
inputs can be associated with a coinciding set of short run
marginal cost (SRMC) and short run average cost (SRAC) curves
unique to that particular, discrete output quantity (Q).
Knowing these least cost combinations of inputs, we can derive
the LRMC and LRAC curves. The relationship between the SRAC
curves and the LRAC curve is that any particular SRAC curve
will be tangent but always above, the LRAC curve at the Q
which represents the optimal combination of inputs necessary
to produce it. In other words, the LRAC curve consists of the
locus of points representing the lowest possible short run
average cost of producing the corresponding output. By
definition, for that Q, the LRMC curve must also equal the
corresponding SRMC curve derived from that same optimal
17
combination of inputs, as illustrated in Figure 5. (Ref. l:pp.
295-297] Note that for Q' (the output level which maximizes
the value of the system), the following relationships hold:
- LRMC = D
- LRMC = SRMC (associated with the least cost input
combination)
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Figure 5. Relationship Between Long Run and
Short Run Cost Curves
In other words, the procedure is as follows:
1. Find the desired output level, Q.
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2. The lowest cost for producing Q is given by the point
on the LRAC curve corresponding to Q.
3. Find the SRAC curve tangential to the LRAC curve at
this point. This SRAC curve defines the lowest cost
combination of inputs necessary to operate at the desired
output level Q.
F. OVERVIEW
At this point, an overview of the problem and the
suggested method of solution might serve to bring things into
sharper focus. We are dealing with an unconstrained
optimization problem involving the combination of inputs
required by the NTS to produce the greatest benefit to the
Navy. The optimal level of output is defined by that point
where LRMC = D. Having defined the optimum production level
Q', the optimal set of production inputs necessary to produce
Q" must next be defined. (Plan in the long run, operate in
the short run.)
Using the relationship between long run and short run
costs we are able to translate Q' into a concrete set of
optimal short run inputs. Realizing this output level Q, and
the inputs necessary to attain it, becomes the task of NTS
management. Application of this model to the choices faced
by NTS management promises that the capacity choice decision





This chapter explores the practical difficulties
encountered when attempting to apply the theoretical approach
to finding optimum long run capacity (described in Chapter
III) to the NTS. The extensive and serious nature of these
difficulties is such that implementation of the aforementioned
theory is concluded to be impractical.
B. DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING COST
In order to find Q' for the NTS, the LRMC and LRAC curves
must be defined. Both curves, in turn, are derived from a
series of SRMC and SRAC curves representing the most efficient
short run combination of inputs for all given output levels
Q. Finding Q', therefore, requires quantifying the optimal
SRMC and SRAC curves corresponding to a representative sample
of long run output levels.
Several additional terms require definition before
proceeding with this analysis.
- Fixed Cost (FC): input cost which remains constant
in the short run regardless of output level. [Ref.
l:p. 2713
- Variable Cost (VC): input cost which varies in the
short run as a function of output level. [Ref. l:p.
20
271]
- Total Cost (TC): the sum of fixed and variable costs.
- Direct Cost: a cost that can be obviously and
physically traced to the particular segment under
consideration. [Ref. 5:p. 43]
- Indirect Cost: a cost that must be aliocated in order
to be assigned to the segment under consideration.
[Ref. 5:p. 44]
The process of quantifying the costs making up the SRMC
and SRAC curves is extremely complex and requires the
application of several subjective judgments. All fixed and
variable costs must be accounted for because SRAC is a
function of TC divided by Q, and SRMC is defined as the change
in VC per change in Q. In order to realize the difficulties
encountered in this procedure let us consider as an example
what might be involved in quantifying these costs for existing
NTS capacity.
First, consider the scale of this undertaking. The NTS
is comprised of literally hundreds of shore facilities spread
out across the globe. Every ship and submarine also carries
gear and personnel onboard dedicated to sending and receiving
message traffic and therefore must be included in any measure
of system cost. The total cost of providing message traffic
service, separated into fixed and variable cost categories,
must be calculated for each and every one of these elements.
The accounting mechanism and procedures for providing this
21
data do not exist. Even if averages and cost models were used
instead of relying on actual dollar figures, the task would
still constitute an enormous undertaking.
Second, consider the complexity involved in determining
costs. The NTS does not rely on a single means of
transmitting message traffic. Numerous propagation paths are
used, such as satellite, various portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum, and land lines." Satellites and
land line modes of communication are not dedicated to
providing NTS service alone, but rather are shared for
different purposes by different agencies. [Ref 6:pp. 7-19]
The exact mix of shared services will vary from one land line
trunk to another and from one satellite to another.
Determining the NTS' share of costs would require looking at
each shared leg of the system individually, and then deciding
how the direct costs should be allocated. Should the
allocation of costs be based on relative share of volume, or
should it consider the importance (i.e., value) of the
information carried, and if so, how should this be done? The
point is that final cost figures which result from such
decisions involve more than simply adding up columns of
figures, particularly if average costs increase or decrease
as capacity of a shared system increases. The extent to which
3 Characterizing the means of transmission in this manner is
an obvious over-simplification, but for the purposes of this
discussion these three means will be used to avoid adding
unnecessary complexity.
22
the judgments invoked in allocating shared direct costs might
be challenged calls into question the resulting cost figures.
Third, to further complicate the above mentioned cost
measurement difficulties, add the additional level of
complexity represented by indirect costs. The problem with
respect to indirect costs is two-fold. First, all indirect
costs must be catalogued, and second, a means for their
allocation must be agreed upon.
For a given communications facility the direct costs, such
as electricity to power the equipment and paper on which to
print messages, are relatively easy to identify and quantify.
Each of these costs stems directly from providing message
service. Indirect costs are much harder to list, let alone
assign the proper cost levels. Indirect costs include things
such as providing a guard at the base gate, street and
building maintenance, food service, welfare and recreation,
etc. Recognizing that it takes more than an antenna, a
transmitter, and a teletype terminal to provide message
service is not difficult. Listing the elements included in
"more" is difficult.
Even if all the indirect inputs were listed, the problem
would still remain as to how their respective costs should be
allocated. The gate guard provides service for the entire
base. How much of this expense should be applied to the NTS?
What basis should be used to make this decision? Number of
personnel? Size of the building? Perhaps since a
23
communications station's security is more important than the
base laundromat's, a greater share of cost should be assigned
to it. Similar questions arise with respect to each category
of indirect cost. Consider air conditioning for a shared
building. How much of this expense goes to NTS? Perhaps the
NTS facility occupies only a small part of the building but
the provision of reliable air conditioning (for electronic
gear) is more important to it than any of the other
facilities.
Consider the number of indirect costs, multiply this by
the number of elements in the NTS, and include these sorts of
questions when dealing with shared communications paths. Once
again, the actual cost amounts will be contingent upon
judgments concerning cost allocations which are anything but
clear cut. The extent to which these judgments might be
questioned reflects directly on the reliability of the figures
produced.
The discussion to this point has concerned itself with the
difficulties inherent in finding costs for the existing NTS.
The task at hand is much more difficult in that cost figures
(with the attendant difficulties mentioned above) are needed
not only for present capacity, but also for a representative
sampling across the entire range of long run capacities, each
set of cost figures aiming to represent the most efficient
combination of inputs possible. By definition this means that
relevant existing and proposed communications technologies
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would have to be critically evaluated. The relative
efficiency of each, in combination with the others, at
selected output levels, would have to be projected.'
The point to be made is not that the cost measuring
process is impossible, but that the task is enormous in scale,
and that currently no accounting system is in place that could
even begin to provide the necessary data.
C. DIFFICULTIES IN DEFINING DEMAND
The demand curve for NTS services is used to correlate
Naval messages and their respective utility, i.e., usefulness.
The shape of the curve is a function of the change in marginal
utility per unit change in output, i.e. number of messages.
How does one quantify the value of a message? For that
matter, how is value assigned to any good or service? The
value of a good or service is best defined in terms of what
one would be willing to give up to obtain it, the common
denominator between goods and services being currency. In
other words, the value of something becomes what one would be
willing to pay for it.
This approach works well with respect to quantifying
demand for goods traded openly in the marketplace.
Information concerning the relationship between value of a
'A representative sample of output levels separated by
designated intervals could be selected for evaluation; therefore,
doing away with the need for evaluation of all output levels, and
greatly simplifying the process. The process remaining, however,
would still be far from simple.
25
good and quantities demanded at each value level is readily
observable, if not directly, then through test markets,
surveys, etc.
How might this same information be obtained for Naval
messages within the NTS? Since the service carries no charge
whatsoever, and never has, demand versus price data is non-
existent.
Certainly some messages carry more value than others. How
is this value to be measured, and how can the number of
messages per value level be determined? It appears doubtful
that survey results could yield data with a sufficient degree
of reliability. Establishing a tes t market would introduce
a great many artificialities with respect to the NTS,
therefore, rendering the results obtained less than optimal.
Perhaps an analysis of large volumes of traffic could be
conducted by expert Naval personnel to assign values and
determine quantities for each value. Results obtained in this
manner would always remain questionable, however, due to an
obvious heavy reliance on the subjective judgments of the
personnel involved. "Given the difficulty in applying all of
the formal methods of valuing information, managers are in
most cases left no alternative but to rely on subjective
evaluation." (Ref 4:p. 30]
D. CONCLUSION
Economic theory provides a sound framework for defining
and understanding long run capacity planning. When applied
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to the short run excess demand situation currently experienced
by the NTS, a clear model whose elements serve to define
optimal NTS capacity is provided. The clarity and logical
elegance of the model is appealing, as is the promise of
providing an objective means to formulate plans leading to
optimization of NTS benefits to the Navy.
The problem lies in the difficulty of quantifying
necessary components of the model with any degree of
certainty. Significant barriers exist with respect to cost
and demand elements, effectively blocking the straightforward
application of theory to real world fact.
Since long run capacity planning is not a unique
requirement of the NTS, we sought to find examples of how
economic theory might have been applied by other
organizations. In so doing we hoped to find information which
might apply to the NTS. Unfortunately, what little was found
reflected on the application of economic theory in a negative
light. One study in particular stood out in that its goal was
to determine whether institutional-level communications
planners used economic concepts in their system planning
procedures, and if so, how were they used? Ten core economic
principles were identified including those concerned with
cost-benefit analysis, fixed-variable costs, marginality, and
system optimization. The study concluded that communication
planners at the top management levels of an organization do
not use economic concepts. Only limited evidence of
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infrequent, implicit, and informal application of economic
principles was found. The authors of that study make no
conclusions regarding the reasons for this paucity of economic
principle application, but raise the questions, "Is it that
the data needed for formal analysis are not available or
affordable? . . . That the concepts are not well-fitted to the
problems that these planners deal with?" [Ref 7:pp. 308-317)
The conclusion drawn from the information and analysis
presented up to this point is that the direct application of
economic theory relating to long run capacity planning is not




Having established that direct application of the economic
theories defining ideal long run system capacity are
impractical, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the
possibility of there being alternative applications of the
economic principles previously described that might be of
practical value to NTS managers. Recall that solving the
problem of excess system demand in the long run might be dealt
with in one of three basic ways: expand system capacity,
reduce demand, or implement some combination of both.
The question then becomes, are there any conclusions that
might be drawn from our previous discussion of economic
principles which might provide at least partial information
to be used in making a decision with respect to these
alternatives?
B. COST, MARGINAL UTILITY, AND DEMAND LEVEL
Upon review of the elements which determine the level of
user demand for NTS services it becomes immediately apparent
that the current condition of excess demand over short run
system capacity should come as no surprise.
Recall that current price to users is measured by
opportunity costs. Opportunity costs are defined as, "...
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potential benefit that is lost or sacrificed when the
selection of one course of action makes it necessary to give
up a competing course of action." [Ref. 5:p. 46] In other
words, the cost incurred by the NTS user entering a message
into the system consists basically of the sacrifice of those
benefits that might have been gained had the time spent
preparing a naval message been invested in some other task.
Costs such as paper, ink, paper clips, etc., are so small as
not to merit consideration as a potential influence on user
behavior.
Although hard data quantifying the precise level of
opportunity costs to the user does not exist (and in fact
would be subject to many of the same barriers faced in
gathering information on other types of cost) it does not
require any great leap of faith to conclude that opportunity
costs to drafters of naval messages are, for the most part,
quite low.
Next consider those factors which are responsible for
shaping user demand for NTS services. Recall the definition
of demand previously given: "... a list of prices and the
corresponding quantities that consumers are willing and able
to purchase..." [Ref. l:p. 22] Users will demand service so
long as the value of their message exceeds or equals their
cost of sending that message. The demand curve for the NTS
illustrates this relationship.
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The costs to users of the NTS, represented by opportunity
costs, are extremely low. Users will demand service up to the
point where the value of the message equals the cost of that
message. Note that by "users" we mean those whom receive
value from a message and, therefore, create a demand for NTS
service. Value from a message may accrue to either senders
or receivers. If it is the sender, then the only costs
imposed are opportunity costs. If it is the receiver, then
no costs are imposed. In either case, these relationships
serve to explain why a high level of demand for NTS services
is to be expected. Furthermore, we can also predict that a
significant proportion of the messages constituting this
demand will be of relatively low value, i.e., down to the point
where their value equals the opportunity cost incurred in
producing it.
C. JUDGMENTAL SURVEY
The fact that user demand is high underlies the initial
assumptions of this thesis concerning excess demand over short
run capacity. But what of the conclusion that a significant
portion of messages constituting this demand are of relatively
low value?
A judgmental survey of selected fleet personnel was
undertaken to provide a qualified validation of this
conclusion. A judgmental survey's results are contingent upon
the surveyor's judgment with respect to population sample
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selection, and survey results appraisal, hence the name.
Judgmental surveys are inherently not subject to any form of
statistical analysis. [Ref. 8:pp. 10-11] Use of a
probability survey (which can be subjected to statistical
analysis) would be problematical for exactly the same reasons
listed to explain barriers to quantifying the NTS user demand
curve. The task is the same in both cases since the NTS
demand curve and marginal utility curve are one and the same.
Results of this judgmental survey cannot provide any sort of
quantifiable results, therefore, but rather they serve to
provide a broad indication of the validity of the
hypothesis.
The survey was conducted in the form of a series of
informal telephone interviews with selected personnel assigned
to both telecommunications and fleet operational billets.
Telecommunications personnel would be familiar with the entire
collection of messages sent, while individuals in operational
billets would be in a unique position to assess the "value"
of message traffic received to their daily operations.
Respondents were initially asked whether all of the message
traffic they received was of value to them in the execution
of their command's mission. Subsequent questions were
tailored to the exact nature of the response given to this
question in an attempt to define broad categories of traffic
whose value was stated to be zero or negligible. Aditional
questions were aimed at having the respondents estimate the
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percentages of message traffic falling into these lowest value
categories. Survey results are reviewed in the following
paragraphs. [Ref. 6]
Survey respondents were unanimous in their appraisal that
a great many of the messages currently being handled by the
NTS were of extremely low value. Value of message traffic was
gauged in terms of its usefulness towards satisfying command
missions on a daily basis. In other words, did it help them,
or others, to do their jobs?
All respondents indicated that a significant percentage
of the traffic they received would have little, or no
significant impact on their job effectiveness had they not
been received at all. Examples of messages frequently cited
as belonging in this category include duplicate messages,
messages received by virtue of Address Indicator Group (AIG)
membership, and various other collectively addressed messages
having no relevance to their particular unit. Estimates of
the percentage of messages belonging in this category ranged
from 50% to 10% of total volume received. These messages
represent the lowest categories of message traffic value
because they are irrelevant to the receiver. In that they are
irrelevant to the receiver, they can hold no value for either
sender or receiver.
Nearly all of the respondents indicated that while a
significant portion of the remaining traffic they received was
indeed valuable to their command, their receipt via the
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electronic transmission channels provided by the NTS was
unnecessary in that their content did not require the speed
inherent in electrical transmission. Frequently cited
examples of messages belonging in this category included
official orders, promotion lists, certain types of
intelligence reports, and numerous other message types which
could be roughly grouped together under the heading of
"administrative" messages. Estimates of the percentage of
messages belonging to this class ranged from 50% to 20%.
With respect to this latter category of message traffic,
respondents acknowledged the existence of official efforts to
curtail entry of messages into the system not requiring
electrical transmission [Ref. 10:pp. 1-3]. Messages not
requiring the speed of service provided by electrical
transmission are directed to be sent by alternate means.
Survey respondents were unanimous in their evaluation that
these efforts, to date, have had little or no effect.
We can broadly interpret these survey results as being
supportive of the prediction that a significant portion of the
message traffic handled by the NTS is of relatively low value.
Furthermore, the survey indicates that a class of messages
exists which are indeed valuable but need not necessarily be
transmitted via the NTS. The unanswered question is whether
the value of this latter class of messages exceeds the long




On the basis of these results what recommendations can be
made? From among the management alternatives to expand system
capacity, reduce demand, or combine some measure of expansion
with demand reduction, we can conclude that the best
alternative must at the very least include demand reduction
to eliminate the lowest categories of message traffic. In
other words, the alternative of expanding long run system
capacity to handle the entire volume of user demand can be
eliminated. Whether eliminating these lowest categories of
traffic would be sufficient to bring system demand within
short run capacity cannot be determined on the basis of the
information at hand.
It is important to note that there is also a cost incurred
by sorting out inappropriate addressees in collectively
addressed messages and AIGs, i.e., the opportunity cost of the
time necessary to accomplish this task. It might still be
optimal to send these irrelevant messages if the cost of
sorting them out exceeds the cost of sending them. This
describes the current situation. Even if higher costs were
attached to sending a Naval message, some irrelevant traffic
would still persist. What we seek is not their total
elimination at any cost, but rather, that senders be forced
to consider the true costs involved before sending them. At





Attaching prices to the service provided by the NTS is the
most direct method available to control user demand. This
chapter will provide an overview of the general categories of
pricing methodologies and their most significant features.
If the cost to the user is raised above current levels
(consisting of opportunity costs alone), then only those
messages whose value is equal to, or greater than, that cost
will make up demand. NTS management should be aware of the
unique characteristics inherent within each type of pricing
scheme in order to evaluate whether this approach should be
adopted to control demand. Any plan ultimately selected would
require tailoring to adapt those features which would best
shape user behavior in terms of the desired system demand
levels.
B. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The following general considerations apply to the
selection of any pricing scheme [Ref. 1l:pp. 102-1043:
- The problem of finding the best pricing system to
achieve organizational goals is not merely an
accounting question. The types of prices which will
stimulate desired user behavior may have nothing to
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do with allocation of actual system costs. A flat
fee, with no relation to any sort of cost architecture
whatsoever, might be as effective as the most complex
cost based pricing system ever devised.
- The pricing scheme must be kept simple so as to render
it understandable to the users. Systems based on
standard costs per unit are typically seen and
supported by users as being more equitable than a
complex, confusing formula.
- It is important that the pricing scheme be viewed as
fair and reasonable by the user.
C. COST-BASED PRICING
Cost-based pricing mechanisms set prices on the basis of
costs incurred in providing the service. Several cost-based
pricing mechanisms are currently in use.
1. Average Total Cost Pricing
Average total cost pricing simply sets price equal to
the per unit average total cost of operation. This approach
has the advantage of being relatively simple to implement (at
least at first glance), and is easily understood by the user.
The equilibrium between demand and supply maintained with
marginal cost pricing is not a feature of average total cost
pricing. With this method the supplier, however, is able to
recover all costs associated with providing the service [Ref.
ll:pp. 27-29].
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Using this method, achieving a balance between supply
and demand becomes nearly impossible owing to the complete
focus on supplier costs while disregarding user demand. An
illustration of what form this sort of imbalance might take
can be found by referring to a hypothetical computer center
which decides to base computer access charges on average costs
of maintaining the center. If this average cost based price
corresponds to a level of user demand lower than the current
level, then demand will fall off. This in turn will raise
average costs, boosting prices, leading to Pnother reduction
in user demand, etc. The end result is an underutilized
computer center charging its users high prices.
The point made by this illustration is that basing
price on average costs, while having an intuitive appeal, can
result in a disastrously counterproductive imbalance of supply
and demand. The imbalance could result in either under- or
overutilization of short run capacity. Only by fortuitous
coincidence will supply and demand balance using this method.
2. Long Run Marginal Cost Pricing
Long run marginal cost pricing is based upon achieving
the goal of maximizing net social benefit. [Ref. 12:pp. 239-
240] The procedure here is exactly the same as the that
described in Chapter III. Briefly restated, the goal is to
balance supply and demand at that output level where demand
equals LRMC. To achieve this, price is set at that level
where D = LRMC. The precise rationale for this appruach will
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not be repeated here, but rather, the reader is referred to
Chapter III for a more detailed description.
Essentially, while the concept of marginal cost
pricing is well defined, obstacles exist which block
implementation of the concept in any objective manner. A more
detailed account of these obstacles is found in Chapter 4.
An additional drawback to this pricing method, not
previously mentioned, should also be pointed out. Setting
prices by this method will result in an imbalance between
supply and demand in the short run. The price level arrived
at by means of LRMC pricing (setting aside for now the
previous objections raised as to the difficulty of achieving
this) will achieve a balance between demand and LRMC. This
balance between supply and demand will only exist for the
short run situation corresponding to this ideal capacity.5
Since the existing short run capacity, with its corresponding
cost curves, will not equal this ideal capacity (except by
fortuitous coincidence), the demand level corresponding to the
price established by this method will result in either excess
capacity or excess demand. An imbalance resulting in excess
demand is illustrated in Figure 6.
5 The reader is referred to Chapter 3 for a more detailed
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Figure 6. Short Run Excess Demand Created
by Long Run Marginal Cost Pricing
However, the positive contribution of an imbalance
created through setting prices in this manner is that feedback
is provided indicating where ideal system capacity is located.
If excess demand is experienced as a result of long run
marginal cost pricing, then we can confidently deduce that
system capacity should be expanded. Conversely, if system
capacity is underutilized, then reduction of the system's size
is called for.
3. Short Run Marginal Cost Pricing
This method sets prices where demand equals marg.nal
costs of production with existing short run capacity. The
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main benefit of using this approach is that a balance between
existing capacity and demand will be achieved.
The drawbacks associated with this approach are many.
Achieving a balance between short run supply and demand
provides no information concerning what level the system
should ideally be operating at in the long run. Managing the
system so that user demand is equal to system capacity is
certainly management's goal, but only insofar as that level
of demand and system capacity approach the optimal level of
operations. The overriding goal is to balance supply and
demand where the greatest utility possible is provided by the
system to its users. This pricing method is not capable of
achieving this without additional information concerning LRMC
and demand.
Furthermore, this method assumes that either a stable
level of demand, or some means of storage for system products
exists. If neither of these conditions applies, then the
system will oscillate between periods of excess demand and
underutilized capacity.
Lastly, as outlined in Chapter 4, quantifying demand
and marginal cost is extremely problematical, rendering this
approach impractical.
D. DEMAND-BASED PRICING
The pricing mechanisms which follow focus on fluctuations
in demand for a particular commodity as a means to set prices.
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1. Peak Load Pricing
The peak load pricing model was developed for products
which cannot be stored (such as NTS capacity) and whose demand
fluctuates with some predictability over time. This type of
demand curve fluctuation typically results in an inefficient
utilization of resources, i.e., either excess capacity if the
system is sized to meet peak demand or unmet demand if the
system is sized to meet average demand. During peak periods
of demand resources may be strained, while during slack
periods resources stand idly by.
The goal of the peak load pricing model is to
discourage excess demand during peak periods and encourage
demand during slack periods so as to create a more even, and
hence efficient, pattern of resource utilization. Typically,
this means establishing higher prices during peak periods as
a means of shifting demand to lower priced off peak hours.
[Ref. 13:p. 33] In the private stzctor, examples of peak load
pricing include telephone rates, early bird specials at
restaurants, etc.
While NTS demand during peacetime fluctuates
predictably, this certainly would not be the case during
periods of emergency or war. The inability to predict demand
during these critical periods is the key drawback for applying
this type of pricing by itself to the NTS. Actually, if
demand fluctuates randomly, we would have to impose higher
prices at all times because it would not be possible to
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predict when the system might become congested. An additional
demand distribution mechanism would also be needed for periods
where demand fluctuates unpredictably.
2. Priority Pricing
If demand fluctuations are unpredictable, peak load
pricing becomes impossible. Priority pricing schemes are used
in this case. Under this pricing scheme, the mechanism for
shifting demand to off peak periods is engaged only when
demand actually approaches system capacity. This is
accomplished by offering the user a variety of rates with the
understanding that those services purchased at higher rates
will take precedence over those purchased at lower rates,
during periods of excess demand. This is not unlike the
message precedence scheme currently employed except
"precedence" becomes a function of price paid by the user.
In the private sector, examples of priority pricing include
first class mail, standby fares on airlines, etc.
The idea is that those users who will benefit the most
from using the service at any given time will be most willing
to pay the higher rates. In this manner, when system capacity
is reached, the service will be self restricting to those
users deriving the maximum benefit from system access. A
balance is created when demand fluctuations are unpredictable.
The most efficient use of the system at any given time is thus
guaranteed. (Ref. 13:p. 188]
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3. Congestion-Based Pricing
Congestion-b&-ed pricing is designed to create an
equitable distribution of demand for service by charging on
the basis of delay time caused by system congestion. During
periods of excess demand, requests for service are placed in
a queue. Charges are assessed based on the length of time
spent in the queue. Obviously, higher charges will accrue
during periods of peak demand. The idea is that users will
tailor their requests for service based on utility gained
versus perceived delay time costs. [Ref. 14:pp. 20-241 While
not explicitly designed in this fashion, an example of this
model is found in value added computer networks such as Genie
or Compuserve. Periods of heavy system usage slow down system
information throughput (i.e., it takes longer to transfer
files, move around to the various network nodes, etc.), and
since charges are assessed by the minute, users accrue higher
charges for system use during periods of peak demand.
E. MARKET-BASED PRICING
Using this method, prices are set based upon observation
of prices for similar goods or services available in the
marketplace. This method is particularly attractive for
industries with a ready availability of outside, competing
services providing the same good and is practiced frequently
in the private sector. [Ref. 11:p. 106) For example, a
businessman opening a new restaurant would probably not
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undertake any sort of economic analysis of his operating costs
and expected customer demand in order to set prices on his
menu. The most likely course of action would be to observe
prices for similar items in comparable restaurants and set
prices accordingly.
The obvious problem with this method is the inability to
find a marketplace environment and set of services which even
remotely resemble the NTS, and therefore, no models upon which
to base NTS costs are found to exist.
F. CONCLUSION
A great deal of further study and analysis is possible
with respect to the workings, advantages, and pitfalls
associated with each type of pricing scheme mentioned. With
this in mind, let us, nevertheless, consider each major
category of pricing methods on the basis of the major features
described above.
1. Cost-Based Methods
The recommendation is against using the cost-based
methods for several reasons. First of all, average total cost
pricing offers as its central quality the ability to recoup
costs incurred in providing the service. This quality is not
of any real advantage with respect to the goal of bringing
user demand within system constraints. This would do little
to alleviate excess demand on the system during peak periods.
This method would reduce demand only to the extent that any
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charge to the user would serve to reduce demand. Prices for
system use might very well be much higher under this scheme
than necessary to meet NTS demand management goals. As the
computer center example pointed out, this pricing method could
easily destabilize supply and demand with either under-or-
overutilization of the system being the end result.
Neither short nor long run marginal cost pricing are
practical alternatives given the extreme difficulty
encountered in quantifying the requisite cost and demand
parameters. Even if these problems could be surmounted
somehow, additional problems remain. LRMC pricing would
create an imbalance between supply and demand in the short
run. These imbalances could only be avoided if system
capacity could instantaneously be changed which, by definition
in the short run, it cannot. Imbalances would continue to
exist until the appropriate short run system configuration was
in operation. This, in turn, might require large amounts of
both time and money. The redeeming feature of this method is
that it provides feedback allowing system managers to reliably
determine whether system expansion or contraction is called
for.
SRMC pricing promises to balance supply and demand
only in the short run. It cannot serve as an aid in moving
towards ideal system capacity. This method is also
inappropriate in that NTS demand is not stable, and system
capacity cannot be stored.
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2. Demand-Based Methods
Demand-based methods redistribute demand more
efficiently than cost-based methods, and also they carry the
advantage of being relatively easy to formulate because
determination of actual costs of operating is not necessary.
Instead, the focus is shifted to determining the effect of
price on the demand curve which is not simple by any means,
but simpler than trying to untangle the complicated costs of
operating the NTS.
Peak load pricing is most appropriate in an
environment where peak usage periods can be predicted. This
is certainly the case for the NTS in peacetime, but during
times of emergency or hostilities this becomes difficult.
Priority pricing carries with it a number of
advantages. If it is important to the originator of a message
for that message to get through, then it seems that they ought
to be willing to pay in direct proportion to that perceived
level of importance. This type of scheme might also be piggy-
backed on top of the already existing and widely understood
message precedence system, thereby providing a relatively
simple, well understood method of charging NTS users.
At the expense of simplicity, peak load pricing could
also be superimposed onto a priority pricing scheme. This
would provide the further benefit of more evenly distributing
demand with respect to system capacity. Some of the burden
experienced by communications centers late each day, and in
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particular, late Friday afternoon, might be shifted to off
peak hours in pursuit of reduced rates at those time.
Obviously, this effect would occur only during periods where
demand levels were predictable, e.g., peacetime, but this
benefit is not insignificant. During periods of demand level
volatility, e.g., wartime, the priority pricing mechanisms
would still serve to guarantee optimal system utilization.
The congestion-based methods' demand distribution
mechanism depends on the user's accurate perceptions
concerning periods of congestion. Once again, as is the case
with peak load pricing, this is reasonably predictable during
peacetime only, but like peak load pricing, it might still
prove useful anyway if used in conjunction with priority
pricing. Between peak load and congestion pricing, peak load





The purpose of this chapter is to assimilate the
information provided in Chapters V and VI in order to form the
basis for a set of general recommendations for the NTS with
respect to demand reduction. Any recommendation made should
only be as specific as allowed by the facts and analysis upon
which it is based. The conclusions reached in the foregoing
chapters are general in nature and are based largely upon
facts painted with rather broad brush strokes. By necessity
then, any recomnendations to follow must retain this same
general character.
In addition, several potential objections to the
implementation of a pricing strategy are discussed. In
response to the first, and most significant objection, a quick
look at the Navy Fuel Allocation ystem is provided as an
example of how this objection might be surmounted.
B. DEMAND BASED APPROACH
Chapter V concludes that a significant portion of message
traffic handled by the NTS is of little or no value. From
this we further conclude that, at the very least, demand
reduction is in order. Chapter VI provides a review of the
salient features inherent in potential pricing strategies.
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Advantages and disadvantages attendant to each are discussed.
Based upon the foregoing information the recommendation to
pursue demand reduction via a demand-based pricing strategy
is made. In particular, a priority pricing model seems most
appropriate in that it does not require demand fluctuations
to be predictable, and it might be superimposed relatively
easily on the existing message precedence hierarchy. Priority
pricing's chief advantage is that optimal use of system
capacity is ensured at all times. The simultaneous addition
of a peak load pricing mechanism would provide additional
advantages resulting from a more even distribution of system
demand, albeit at some cost to simplicity. Also, since the
class of message traffic with the lowest value, to a large
extent, deals with ineffecient use of collective addresses,
the specific plan adopted should consider the number of
message addressees when assessing charges (in addition to
precedence level).
Obviously a much more detailed set of specifications is
required before the first steps toward implementation could
be made. The additional research and analysis to accomplish
this, however, falls outside the scope of this thesis. This
need might serve as the starting point for subsequent work
seeking follow up on the ideas presented here.
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C. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
1. Who Generates System Demand?
A pricing scheme raises the cost of entering a message
into the NTS and thereby provides a means for controlling
demand. This conclusion, however, is valid only if the costs
of entering a message are actually being carried by those who
originate the demand for NTS service, i.e., these who desire
value from the service. What if the origin for NTS demand is
not to be found with the message drafters who would be charged
in a simple pricing scheme? If this were the case, then
pricing messages would only serve to create a burden for
message drafters and leave demand levels untouched.
One objection to pricing of messages asserts that the
origin of NTS demand lies with those agencies or offices
requiring that the message traffic be sent and not with the
originators of the messages themselves. By application of the
logic detailed above, establishing a pricing mechanism would
have little or no effect on reducing demand. This argument
recognizes that the bulk of messages in the system are sent
because they have to be sent. They are sent in response to
regulations, inquiries, or reporting requirements established
at a level higher in the chain of command.
A single message from COMNAVSURFPAC requiring a
monthly status report on damage control readiness training,
for example, would generate thousands of messages in response,
on a monthly basis, until the status report requirement is
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either superceded or rescinded. Now then, which NTS users are
generating the demand level represented by these thousands of
messages? It appears that the total demand represented by
these thousands of messages is actually created by
COMNAVSURFPAC; however, in a simple pricing scheme they would
only be charged for entering a single message into the system.
The point is that demand is generated by those whom receive
value from the message, and this is frequently the message
receiver whose actions caused the message to be sent in the
first place. This example illustrates how pricing might have
no significant effect on controlling user demand unless prices
are borne by those who receive value from the messages. In
this manner, the overall ability of a simple pricing system
to control user demand is seriously challenged. There are at
least two ways of dealing with this which will be outlined
further on.
2. Need for an Accounting System
Assuming that pricing of messages could control system
demand, at least one other major potential objection to
following this sort of strategy is seen to exist. In order
to charge for NTS services, it is obvious that some sort of
accounting system would be required to keep track of
"customers" and their bills. Who used the service, when, and
to what extent would have to be known in order to calculate
the appropriate charges. A method of keeping users informed
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of their accrued charges and tracking payments would also be
required.
With the addition of two further observations the
significance of this potential objection becomes readily
apparent. First, an accounting system capable of
accomplishing the sorts of tasks described above does not
currently exist. Second, an accounting system of this type
would probably be rather expensive to create owing to its
requisite size and complexity.
D. NAVY FUEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: AN ANALOGY
If NTS demand, or a very large part of it, is ultimately
generated by those agencies, offices, commands higher in the
chain of command, and regulations requiring responses, then
any pricing scheme can only be successful if the increase in
costs can influence their behavior. Not only would pricing
be ineffective in curbing demand, but it would impose an
additional burden on NTS users. It does not seem fair to
charge users for a service whose usage is required and that,
therefore, they have no control over. Can this problem be
circumvented, and if so, how?
One possible solution would be to somehow peg prices to
the total number of messages, including required responses,
which a message entered into the system generates. A plan of
this sort, however, would be almost impossible to implement.
How could one devise a method of looking at a message in order
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to measure the number of responses it would require? Even if
a method could be found, it is apt to be complex, poorly
understood, and difficult to execute. This procedure would
also be ineffective with respect to messages not sent in
response to another message, but rather, in response to
standing requirements and regulations.
Perhaps one method of implementing a pricing system whose
enhanced cost effect is felt in full, even at the highest
levels in the chain of command, would be to pattern it after
the Fuel Management System used to allocate and account for
fuel usage in the fleet. The situation with respect to fuel
used in the fleet is analagous to the NTS and the extent to
which its services are used by the fleet.
Fuel is a resource whose usage requires careful
management. Demand for its use must be controlled. Any given
ship is allotted a quarterly fuel "budget", i.e., a finite
quantity, the use of which must not be exceeded. For the most
part, the individual ship has no control over where it must
be, how fast it must steam to get there, etc. In other words,
a ship has little control over the factors which determine the
amount of fuel it uses. The ship, nevertheless, is required
to remain within its allotted budget. This seems very much
like the situation where a ship would be charged for entering
messages into the NTS yet it would have no control over the
requirement to send the message. Control over that
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requirement resides higher up in the chain of command as do
the directives which control a ship's movements.
Now then, what feedback mechanisms exist in the Fuel
Management System [Ref. 15] to control the overall use of fuel
by the fleet? Control of total demand for fuel is maintained
by a system which sets fuel allocations at various levels in
the fleet command hierarchy all the way down to the individual
units. Some finite quantity of fuel is given to CINCPACFLT
annually, which is to be used to support fleet operations for
the entire year. This pool is then allocated to Third and
Seventh Fleets on a quarterly basis. Each fleet then further
divides its allocation among the various Cruiser-Destroyer and
Amphibious Groups which it in turn is responsible for. Within
each Group, fuel is allocated among the squadrons, and then
ultimately, each squadron allocates fuel to each of its
individual ships.
At each step along the way the allocation amounts are set
according to a planning procedure which focuses on tentative
schedules, operational tempo, exercises, real world missions,
various ship-type burn rates, etc. Conversely, planning
procedures at every level in the chain of command operate
within the constraints imposed by the amount of fuel
available. In this manner, Fleet planners are able to achieve
a balance between demand for fuel and available supply. An
accounting procedure is in place which tracks actual fuel
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amounts consumed and compares them against budgeted figures
in order to monitor planning efficiency. [Ref. 16]
What if the same sort of procedure were established with
respect to the supply and demand for NTS services? This would
circumvent the objection raised concerning costs not being
felt by the actual sources of demand. First, prices would be
established for messages (for purposes of this illustration
the exact pricing method applied is irrelevant). Based upon
NTS capacity, a finite budget to be used for NTS services
could be given to the Fleet Commanders. An allocation process
similar to that used for fuel would then be applied in order
to allocate slices of the budget all the way down to the
individual unit level.
One difference between the two schemes is that while fuel
is allocated by quantity, messages would more appropriately
be allocated by use of a finite budget and pricing. The
reason for this difference derives from the nature of the
resource being allocated. Fuel can be stored over time and
is homogenous in that one barrel of fuel is not different than
another. Message traffic capacity, on the other hand, cannot
be stored and is not homogenous in that messages vary in terms
of length, and required speed of transmission. A set of
prices set to reflect these differences with a total budget
set to reflect system capacity, is the better way to reflect
these differences.
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Planners at all levels in the chain of command would be
forced to balance the finite supply (i.e., NTS capacity) of
communications resources against demand. Demand would have
to be planned within the constraints imposed by the available
budget. Pricing supplies the feedback mechanism for
monitoring the effectiveness of communications planning. The
total cost for messages, including the cost of required
responses, would have to be considered by all levels in the
chain of command under this plan just as fuel consumption by
subordinates must be considered when ordering ship movements.
By manipulating prices and budget amounts, demand levels
for NTS service could effectively be controlled. By attaching
higher prices to message service the lowest value message
traffic could be eliminated thereby eliminating the problems
created by excess demand over short run capacity. Pricing
could be used to effectively control demand.
Modeling NTS resource allocation after the Fuel Management
System would require the creation of an accounting system to
monitor message traffic service. The aforementioned problems
concerning cost and complexity would remain. The question to
be answered is whether a system can be devised cheaply enough
so that the benefits gained from improved NTS efficiency are
seen to outweigh the costs of creating such a system.
Another method perhaps simpler to implement, would be to
include accounting codes, designating who is to be charged for
replies, along with all messages requiring a response. This
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technique would function very much like requiring the
inclusion of a self-addressed stamped envelope along with each
message requiring a reply. In this manner, the costs incurred





This thesis has attempted to accomplish a number of varied
goals. Foremost among them is the explanation concerning
excess demand over short run system cap acity and the manner
in which ideal system capacity is defined. Economic
principles were used as the tools to accomplish this.
Throughout, the perspective has been from the point of view
of a manager of the NTS and the sorts of decisions which they
would have to make to ensure efficient system operation.
The concept of ideal system capacity is well understood.
The inability to translate this concept into any sort of
practical, objective plan is of great concern to the NTS
manager. The search for information of practical value led
to a reexamination of the facts and principles applicable to
the NTS situation. On the basis of this reexamination a
hypothesis was formed that excess demand, including a
relatively large number of low value messages included in its
make-up, was caused by the extremely low cost imposed by the
NTS on its users.
This conclusion was then subjectively validated by way of
a judgmental survey collected from fleet personnel. On the
basis of the survey results, demand reduction was advocatp-s.
Whether demand should be reduced to the bounds of present
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short run capacity, or whether system expansion to some degree
is also called for, cannot be decided on the basis of the
information at hand. In any case, demand reduction is
certainly called for as a step towards optimal usage of NTS
capacity, short and long run.
What followed was a review of the salient characteristics
of various pricing mechanisms in order to judge their
appropriateness for adoption by the NTS. Demand-based methods
are seen as superior to cost based, and key features of
priority pricing, specifically, make this particular model
appropriate for the environment within which the NTS operates.
Lastly, two key objections to any sort of pricing strategy
were outlined. The first dealt with the inherent inability
of prices to control demand within the NTS, and the second
raised the issues of cost and complexity with respect to the
accounting system that a pricing strategy would require.
A look at the Navy Fuel Management System provided a means
of circumventing the serious problems raised by the first
objection. The second objection's significance depends on the
value attached to achieving efficient NTS operation.
Without any sort of demand management mechanism, the NTS
is faced with two possible courses of action. The first is
simply to stand by while demand increases and manage the
resulting problems as efficiently as possible. The second is
to respond to each demand increase with an increase in system
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capacity. Historically, the second of these two alternatives
has been followed.
Perhaps the most solid conclusion reached by the author
is that the recommendations and findings of this thesis are
only preliminary. Extensive follow on work is required before
solid information usable at a "Monday morning action meeting"
can confidently be provided to NTS decision makers.
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This thesis has attempted to cover a great deal of
territory in a very short space. Much additional study
remains in order to fully develop the ideas and arguments
mentioned.
With respect to the starting assumptions, i.e., that
demand exceeds NTS short run capacity, more work is required
to quantify the precise nature of demand for NTS service and
key contributing factors to excess demand. A complete
statistical analysis concerning the breakdown of message
traffic volume by originator, number and type of addressees,
and general message subject trends would contribute towards
a better understanding of how demand might best be managed.
Also, to what extent is excess demand a function of an
increase in the number or length of messages entered into the
system?
In the realm of demand management methods, additional
questions concerning the efficacy of administrative methods,
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both past and future, to control demand require exploration.
With respect to pricing methods a much more complete study
concerning the operation, advantages, and disadvantages of
each as they might be used by the NTS is required before a
more detailed set of recommendations might be forwarded.
Another relevant question is what form might the requisite
accounting system take in order to meet desired goals such as
economy, efficiency, and simplicity?
Lastly, are the costs attendant to imposing demand
management strategies excessive in light of potential
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